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Available online xxxxEquity crowdfunding is a new form of entrepreneurial ﬁnance, in which investors do not re-
ceive perks or engage in pre-purchase of the product, but rather participate in the future
cash ﬂows of a ﬁrm. In this paper, we analyze what determines individual investment decisions
in this new ﬁnancial market. One important factor that may inﬂuence the behavior of investors
is the way the portal allocates securities. We use unique data from four German equity
crowdfunding portals to examine how the allocation mechanism affects funding dynamics. In
contrast with the crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter, on which the typical pattern of pro-
ject support is U shaped, we ﬁnd that equity crowdfunding dynamics are L shaped under a
ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served mechanism and U shaped under a second-price auction. The evidence
also shows that investors base their decisions on information provided by the entrepreneur
in the form of updates as well as by the investment behavior and comments of other crowd
investors.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).JEL classiﬁcations:
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Entrepreneurial ﬁnance1. Introduction
In recent years, crowdfunding has become a mainstream source of funding for early-stage ﬁrms. Equity crowdfunding (also
referred to as investment-based crowdfunding, securities-based crowdfunding, and crowdinvesting) is a sub-category ofexander Groh, Tobin Hanspal, Dietmar Harhoff, Mingfeng Lin, Jay Ritter, Denis Schweizer, Elisabeth Schulte,
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2 L. Hornuf, A. Schwienbacher / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2017) xxx–xxxcrowdfunding in which ﬁrms issue ﬁnancial securities to satisfy their capital needs. At this point, empirical research on equity
crowdfunding is still scarce, because this market segment was not available until only recently to the general crowd in jurisdic-
tions such as the United States or lacked speciﬁc regulation elsewhere to facilitate its development (Hornuf and Schwienbacher,
2017b).
Some seminal articles on equity crowdfunding have described the size, growth, and geographic distributions of the market
(Vulkan et al., 2016; Günther et al., 2017), have analyzed the static factors that affect funding success based on ultimate campaign
outcome (Ahlers et al., 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017a), and have provided ﬁrst insights into the returns on investment
(Hornuf and Schmitt, 2016; Signori and Vismara, 2016). Agrawal et al. (2016) show that syndicates help well-informed lead in-
vestors in equity crowdfunding extend their knowledge to a less well-informed crowd that is consequently willing to invest in a
company. In a similar vein, Vismara (2017) evidences that founders have a greater chance of reaching the funding goal in an eq-
uity crowdfunding campaign if they possess more social capital as measured by the number of the founder's LinkedIn connections.
More recently, scholars have focused on the dynamic effects of equity crowdfunding. As the ﬁrst researcher to assess dynamics
in equity offerings, Vismara (2017) shows that information cascades among individual investors are an important factor in the
equity crowdfunding investment process. By running a cross-sectional analysis on the portal Crowdcube, he ﬁnds that invest-
ments in the early days of a campaign are important in attracting investors later on and consequently increase the probability
of funding success. These ﬁndings highlight the existence of dynamic effects within campaigns that are generally overlooked in
other studies. Another recent article investigates whether information disclosure in the form of updates affects the investment dy-
namics on Companisto and Seedmatch (Block et al., 2017). The authors ﬁnd that startups can provide credible information about
their quality when posting updates about their new developments, such as funding events, business developments, and cooper-
ation projects.
None of these studies, however, have examined how different share allocation mechanisms affect investments by the crowd. A
distinct aspect of equity crowdfunding is that ﬁnancial securities can be allocated to investors in different ways. Knowing which
market mechanisms make a funding successful is important for entrepreneurs and portal managers. In contrast with reward-
based crowdfunding, two models are commonly used in equity crowdfunding: the ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served (FCFS) and the auction
mechanism. The choice of market mechanism is likely to inﬂuence the dynamics of investor behavior during the campaign. For
example, because prices remain constant under the FCFS mechanism, investors have no incentive to withhold their bids and
may bid early to maximize their chances of obtaining securities. Under an auction mechanism, investors may prefer to wait
until the end so as not to disclose their interests in buying securities, which could induce more demand. In this case, a stronger
end effect may occur, shifting the dynamics of individual investments toward the end of the campaign.
The current research adds to the literature on funding dynamics in equity crowdfunding by investigating how the functioning
of different market mechanisms that determine the allocation of securities to investors affects the investment process. In addition
to the allocation mechanisms, we examine the effects of permitting investors to comment on their investments and making the
amounts pledged visible to peer investors. We test our predictions using a comprehensive dataset of individual investments made
on four different portals in Germany. In contrast with the crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter, on which the typical pattern of
project support is U shaped, we ﬁnd that the mechanism used to allocate securities affects equity crowdfunding dynamics. When
the allocation occurs on an FCFS basis, equity crowdfunding dynamics are L shaped, and we observe a relatively weak end-of-cam-
paign effect. This suggests that there is a collective attention effect during the ﬁrst days of the campaign but no late bidding trig-
gered by run-ups or sniping. This L-shaped pattern occurs even though equity crowdfunding campaigns are not open-ended,
which contrasts with most reward-based crowdfunding campaigns. Indeed, waiting until the end is risky because crowd investors
face the chance of no longer being able to invest after all shares are allocated.
However, on Innovestment, an equity crowdfunding portal running a second-price auction, the dynamics of backer support are
U shaped. Next to the collective attention at the start of the campaign, we document a sharp increase in investor support by the
end of the funding process. For example, the average number of daily investments made in a campaign increases by approximate-
ly 40% after 90% of the funding limit is reached. Under a second-price auction mechanism, it might be worthwhile for crowd in-
vestors to put their investment decisions off until the campaign ends. This is because bids reveal private information about the
value of the ﬁrm to other investors, creating more capital supply that drives up the price per ticket. In addition, when securities
are allocated through an auction mechanism, the campaign will not be stopped prematurely even if investors have bought off all
the available securities. At ﬁrst glance, the Innovestment second-price auction has the desirable property of allocating resources
more efﬁciently (Vickrey, 1961; Kagel and Levin, 2001), because individual investors make sealed bids on Innovestment. However,
although individual bids are sealed, investors can still see the currently applicable second price of the campaign, which largely
suspends the classic feature of a Vickrey auction. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that a smaller proportion of ﬁrms receive funding
under the auction mechanism. Whether this is because investors do not understand the more complex rules of a second-price
auction or because investors only pick the ﬁrms with better future prospects can only be analyzed after reliable data on ultimate
campaign outcomes become available.
Furthermore, we document that investors consider information provided by entrepreneurs in the form of updates as well
as peer investments and comments posted by other investors. The effect is most pronounced when an investor's comment
contains potentially valuable feedback on the product or market, that is, when the comment suggests that the crowd investor
knows the product or claims to be an expert in the ﬁeld of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm and offers personal help to the
founder. Claims of second-time investments by earlier investors also positively affect the investment decisions of other funders.
Thus, comments induce other investors to participate, even though they are not able to verify whether the claims made are
accurate.Please cite this article as: Hornuf, L., Schwienbacher, A., Market mechanisms and funding dynamics in equity crowdfunding, J.
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business model under which different portals operate. In Section 3, we formulate hypotheses on different allocation mechanisms,
the inﬂuence of information, and behavioral aspects. Section 4 presents the data and methodology. Section 5 outlines the empir-
ical results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Equity crowdfunding in Germany
2.1. Deﬁning equity crowdfunding
Equity crowdfunding is a category of crowdfunding, in which backers expect ﬁnancial compensation for their investment. To
motivate the crowd to participate in the future proﬁts of the ﬁrm, fundraisers in some jurisdictions offer equity shares in a private
limited liability company (LLC), as is the case on portals such as Crowdcube or Seedrs (Vismara, 2016) in the United Kingdom. In
Germany, startups do not offer common shares in an LLC, as this would require the involvement of a costly notary (Braun et al.,
2013). Nevertheless, common shares of a public LLC have been used in one large campaign by the German portal Bergfürst, which
has also established a secondary market on which securities can be freely traded. Typically, German startups running an equity
crowdfunding campaign use mezzanine ﬁnancial instruments such as subordinated proﬁt-participating loans (so-called
partiarische Darlehen) or silent partnerships, which represent a virtual share in the startup that is mimicked by contract law.
The market in Germany might therefore reﬂect a “quasi-equity” crowdfunding market. Nevertheless, the way crowdfunding
takes place in Germany is not as particular. For example, Indiegogo—the main competitor of Kickstarter—allows startups to run
equity crowdfunding campaigns on its portal,1 many of which use similar ﬁnancial contracts to those used on the German market.
In Belgium, MyMicroInvest uses participating notes, which also share some characteristics with the instruments used in Germany.
Before the campaign goes online, the startup and the portal must agree on a valuation of the ﬁrm, and the founders must de-
cide how much capital they want to raise. Depending on the valuation and capital needs of the ﬁrm, the portal provides a stan-
dardized ﬁnancial contract so that the crowd can participate in the future cash ﬂows of the startup. As mentioned previously, the
crowd generally holds a mezzanine ﬁnancial instrument in the quasi-equity crowdfunding markets in Germany, which ranks
above ordinary shares and shareholder loans but below all ordinary liabilities. These ﬁnancial instruments cannot be sold on a
secondary market and often have a life span of three to seven years. In the past, many startups raised 100,000 EUR and offered
250 EUR tickets to the investors. If the ﬁrm value was, for example, determined to be 1,000,000 EUR, an investor buying a single
ticket obtained a right to 0.023% of the future cash ﬂows of the ﬁrm. It is important to note that in this case, the ﬁrm neither sells
existing shares of the LLC nor issues new shares. Rather, investors in these quasi-equity crowdfunding markets simply hold a right
to receive a pro-rata payment of the ﬁrm's proﬁts without any of the rights attached to an equity share, such as voting rights.
Although investors do not participate in the losses of the ﬁrm (margin requirements do not exist), there is a high risk that the
startup will fail and investors will not receive any ﬁnancial return from the securities bought. Moreover, in many cases investors
might even lose their original principal investment.
2.2. Equity crowdfunding portals in Germany
Equity crowdfunding portals in Germany largely follow the business model outlined in Section 2.1. Nevertheless, some of them
have adopted slightly different business practices to differentiate themselves from their competitors. It is worth outlining the sim-
ilarities and major differences across the four portals under consideration in this study because they might affect the funding
dynamics.
First, early movers can establish a large and overall more solvent user base over time. These portals can mobilize a greater sup-
ply of capital, and they possess the reputation of running serious campaigns. By the year 2016, 59 equity crowdfunding portals
were established on the German market, 37 of which had hosted one or more successful campaigns (Dorﬂeitner et al., 2017). Dur-
ing our observation period, three of these portals made up 85% of the market share in terms of capital raised and 82% when con-
sidering the number of startups that got funded. These three portals were Seedmatch, Innovestment, and Companisto.
Seedmatch and Innovestment successfully funded their ﬁrst campaigns in late 2011 and were the ﬁrst portals to operate on
the German market. Companisto joined a year later but soon caught up with the other two portals. United Equity is a smaller por-
tal, and it accomplished its ﬁrst successful campaign in 2013. Because of its status as a latecomer, United Equity does not beneﬁt
from the user base and reputation of the somewhat older portals. Funding a speciﬁc amount of money on United Equity thus
takes longer, and the campaign suffers from a higher risk of not being completed successfully. This situation is in line with the
empirical evidence provided subsequently, as funding periods are generally shorter for Seedmatch, Innovestment, and
Companisto.
Second, most often backers make a direct investment in the startup in which they want to hold securities. During our obser-
vation period, this held true for ﬁnancial contracts of all but one German portal. Companisto set up a special purpose vehicle that
pools the investments made in each campaign run on the portal and then invests the capital raised from the crowd in the startup
in which these investors want to hold securities.2 After the equity crowdfunding has taken place, the pooled investment helps
venture capital ﬁrms negotiate with a single counterparty and makes buying-out the crowd easier. While more conﬁdent founders1 See https://equity.indiegogo.com.
2 Nowadays, Companisto uses a pooling and carry agreement, which serves the same purpose.
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why pooled investments should inﬂuence the funding dynamics at a particular point in time of the investment cycle.
Third, under the all-or-nothing model, founders set a funding goal and keep nothing unless this goal is achieved (Cumming et
al., 2014). All German equity crowdfunding portals operate under this all-or-nothing model. Nevertheless, they also allow the
crowd to over-subscribe the issue up to a funding limit. Frequently, the funding goal has been set at 50,000 EUR. If this amount
cannot be raised within a pre-speciﬁed period, the capital pledged is given back to the investors. Moreover, most German equity
crowdfunding portals operating an all-or-nothing model allocate securities on an FCFS basis. Under this model, founders set an
overall funding limit and stop selling securities to the crowd after the limit is reached. In the early years, the funding limit was
often set at 100,000 EUR. After this threshold was reached, the funding process stopped before the pre-speciﬁed funding period
came to an end, and investments were no longer sold to the crowd.
Innovestment has deviated from this model by implementing a three-stage, multi-unit second-price auction (Hornuf and
Neuenkirch, 2017). After the start of the auction, investors can make pledges by specifying the number of tickets they want to
buy and the price they are willing to pay for each ticket. In line with the other platforms, the portal and the startup determine
a lower threshold for the price of a single ticket. During the ﬁrst phase of the auction, everyone who pledges money is allotted
the desired number of tickets, and the lowest posted price applies to everyone. Therefore, investors have no reason to outbid
the lower threshold at this phase, unless they want to avoid the transaction cost of bidding again later.
The second phase of the auction starts when a pre-determined number of investment tickets have been allocated to the crowd.
The number of tickets and, thus, the start of the second stage of the auction are not known to Innovestment investors until all
tickets have been allocated. In this phase, the number of tickets is kept constant, and investors can outbid each other by posting
higher prices. Importantly, the second phase is not restricted to investors from the ﬁrst phase. Everyone who is registered on the
portal can still join the bidding process. The second phase continuous until the funding limit is reached. For most campaigns on
Innovestment, the funding limit was 100,000 EUR. The third and last phase of the auction starts as soon as the pre-determined
funding limit is reached. During this phase, investors can still outbid one another. At this point, however, it is no longer possible
to increase the overall sum of funds. Higher bids therefore result in the overall number of tickets being reduced, thus lowering the
number of investments a startup must sell for a given amount of capital.3
In practice, one should bear in mind that only a few campaigns reached the third phase of the auction, while all other cam-
paigns ended before the third or even second phase was reached. Moreover, while the auction mechanism was developed by
an academic with the aim to design an optimal auction, the crowd might struggle to fully understand the mechanism.4 What
should be clear to the crowd is that the different phases of the auction mechanism have no hard-ending rule, as everyone can
still invest at each phase of the auction until the pre-determined duration of the funding cycle ends. Thus, unlike under the
FCFS mechanism, in which it might merely be risky for the crowd to postpone an investment decision, investors might bid late
under the auction mechanism, which could ultimately drive up the price per share. However, over-bidding can only occur in
the second and third phases of the auction.
3. Hypotheses
Scholars have offered various explanations of what determines an individual investment decision. In this study, we test some
of the most prevalent theories for the equity crowdfunding market in light of the portal designs that were implemented in
practice.
3.1. Allocation mechanism
According to Fama (1965), in an efﬁcient capital market it is fundamental information that determines the value of a security
at every point in time. If investors lack knowledge of the fundamental value of an entrepreneurial ﬁrm, they may follow a naive
portfolio diversiﬁcation strategy such as 1/N or abstain from buying securities altogether. The ﬁrst time the crowd learns about
the venture is before an equity crowdfunding campaign even starts. All four equity crowdfunding portals require a business
plan—including a ﬁnancial forecast—available to potential investors. The information is open to all users of the portal before
and during the investment process, which gives investors enough time to review the material before the campaign starts. In prin-
ciple, the disclosure of the business plan should not affect the dynamics of the funding process later on.5 If anything, we would
expect more investments in the early days of the funding cycle based on this information, leading to an L-shaped investment
pattern.
Research on consumer behavior in the digital economy conﬁrms such an investment pattern, stressing that information on the
Internet is so plentiful that attention becomes limited over time (Wu and Huberman, 2007; Hodas and Lerman, 2013). It has
therefore been hypothesized that attention in large groups follows an L-shape pattern. This is because attention to news ﬁrst3 The second phase of the auction was merged by the platform with the third phase from November 1, 2012 onwards, which led to a simpliﬁcation of the auction
mechanism. Consequently, theﬁrst phase continued until the funding limitwas reached. Immediately thereafter, the third phase started. Thismodiﬁcation did not affect
the principal nature of the auction though.
4 Innovestment recently abolished the auction mechanism in favor of an FCFS model, as operated by all other German equity crowdfunding portals. However, our
sample only covers campaigns run under the auction mechanism.
5 Becoming a user takes only a fewminutes and requires potential investors to register with the portal. Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017a) ﬁnd that business plan
length affects neither the amount raised in a campaign nor the intensity of crowd participation.
Please cite this article as: Hornuf, L., Schwienbacher, A., Market mechanisms and funding dynamics in equity crowdfunding, J.
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to a campaign is reinforced by advertising campaigns and newsletters sent to potential investors by the portal before the cam-
paign starts. Second, the news about a new campaign decays over time, resulting in fewer investments being made, a phenom-
enon also referred to as “collective attention effect” in the context of crowdfunding (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2017).
As the portals under consideration provide a primary market only and organized trading is not possible after the issuance of
shares, an end-of-campaign effect may arise because no further trading takes place when the equity crowdfunding campaign is
over (in contrast with an initial public offering, in which trading continues on the stock market). A well-known phenomenon
in Internet auctions is late bidding, often referred to as “sniping” (Ariely et al., 2005). While under an FCFS mechanism late bid-
ding may occur because of conformity and imitation (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Roth and Ockenfels, 2002), under an auction it
most likely results from bidders changing their evaluations of the startup in response to the information in others' bids. Investors
might therefore want to bid late to avoid conveying information to the crowd. As a result, everyone tries to bid late in an auction
with a hard-ending rule. By contrast, the crowd does not post a price on an investment ticket under the FCFS funding mechanism,
as the price is set at the start of the campaign and does not change thereafter. Thus, there is no reason for investors to hold out to
avoid a price surge under an FCFS mechanism and risk the campaign being sold out.
If sniping occurs in equity crowdfunding, it likely does so during the multi-unit second-price Innovestment auction outlined in
Section 2.2. After all, if there is excessive demand for investments in the startup, bidding early might lead to a bidding war among
investors, which ultimately drives up the price per ticket that is known to all investors. However, such a bidding war will most
likely occur during the second and third phases of the auction or by the end of the funding period, as investors can join the auc-
tion at any point, making early investments and the associated disclosure of information via a bid unnecessary. Considering the
combined impact of the collective attention effect and late bidding, we expect investment dynamics to be U shaped under an auc-
tion mechanism rather than L shaped. Moreover, late bidding should be weak (if any) under the FCFS mechanism.
H1. Investment dynamics under an FCFS mechanism follow an L-shaped pattern. Late bidding is more likely to occur under an
auction, leading to U-shaped funding dynamics.
Furthermore, as equity crowdfunding campaigns are only successful if a certain minimum funding threshold is reached, the
funding dynamics might change when this point is surpassed. Reaching the minimum funding goal might provide evidence to po-
tential investors that a critical mass of investors believes in the startup. In addition, according to Cumming et al. (2014), crowd
investors face a much lower risk when the minimum funding goal is reached, because the entrepreneurial ﬁrm is less likely to
be underfunded. This lower risk may induce more crowd investors to pledge their funds.
H2. Investments accelerate after the minimum funding goal is reached.3.2. Information provision
The traditional ﬁnance literature (Fama, 1965; Ball and Brown, 1968; Fama et al., 1969; Scholes, 1969) predicts that if material
information leaks to the market, investors immediately update their assessment of ﬁrm value and begin buying securities as soon
as the information is disclosed.6 After the funding period has started and the venture accepts pledges from investors, investors can
continue to learn more about the startup because the portal, in cooperation with the startup, may post updates on the portal
website. Such updates might be considered a trustworthy source of information because they come from the startup itself.
Block et al. (2017) argue that startups that release updates about funding events, business developments, and cooperation pro-
jects provide valuable information about their quality. Of course, the crowd can also learn about the startup from any other online
or ofﬂine media source. The evidence shows, however, that portals quickly react to any relevant public information to promote
the startup or to avert damage from the current campaign.7 Thus, information updates on the portal website should be the
main source of information for investors.
H3. Posting information updates on the portal website increases investor participation.
In a survey by NESTA (2014), 69% of the investors engaging in crowdlending stated that comments by other investors are im-
portant or very important regarding their own investment decisions. The information provided by other investors can be valuable
for multiple reasons. First, the investor may provide information on how to improve the product, how to access more customers,
or how to extend the business concept to another market. Second, the investor may offer personal help, which can range from
distributing a leaﬂet to providing legal advice. Third, the investor may comment that he or she has already tried the product
or service and offer evidence of its efﬁciency. Fourth, the investor may claim to know the market or to have experience in the
industry, providing evidence of the viability of the business concept. Fifth, the investor may indicate that he or she is making an-
other investment in the same ﬁrm, showing conﬁdence in the investment overall. Committing more money might be a sign of a6 In recent years, the behavioral ﬁnance literature has contested this view. Ben-Shahar and Schneider (2014), for example, claim that the disclosure individuals need
to deal with on a daily basis is already so extensive that they cannot read or react to all the information presented to them.
7 See, for example, the speculations that the startup Larovo is allegedly insolvent, which was quickly acted on by the portal Seedmatch: http://blog.seedmatch.de/
2014/03/11/spekulationen-zu-larovo-ein-statement/.
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ment decisions.
The only portal that does not allow comments by investors is Innovestment, because it operates a sealed-bid auction mecha-
nism, in which investors observe the overall progress of the funding process but do not see individual investment decisions or
comments by other investors. Burtch et al. (2015) ﬁnd that information controls induce an increase in fundraising, because
backers are more willing to engage with the platform, while decreasing the average contribution. They explain this result with
a publicity effect, according to which backers respond to a lack of privacy by lowering extreme contributions. As anyone can
use a fake user name and there is no way to privately contact an investor via the platforms under consideration in our study,
we do not worry about the privacy concerns of investors. Thus, we hypothesize that investors take the information provided
by other investors into account when making an investment decision, but abstract from privacy issues.
H4. Positive comments of previous investors increase follow-up investor participation.3.3. Investment behavior by others
In the spirit of Spence (1973), investors might not regard information posted by other investors as credible. After all, investors
who already decided to invest might not provide a balanced view, as they may suffer from conﬁrmation bias (Chapman and
Johnson, 2002) and therefore ex post justify their investment decisions. By contrast, potential investors might infer new informa-
tion from the actual behavior of their peers. Business angels and other more sophisticated investors have more experience and
might examine the startup more intensely by directly contacting the founders. These investors naturally invest larger amounts,
which in turn makes a more thorough due diligence economically worthwhile. In this case, the crowd might update the perceived
value of the venture from the investment behavior of others, especially if those investments are large. Finally, the crowd might act
not only on the investment decisions of others but also on their disinvestment decisions, as portals provide a right to investors to
withdraw their pledges within a two-week period after making an investment.8
H5a. Investor participation increases when investors observe a large investment.
H5b. Investor participation decreases when investors observe withdrawals.4. Data and methods
4.1. Data
We use data from four German equity crowdfunding portals from November 6, 2011, till August 28, 2014. The portals we con-
sider in our analysis represent four-ﬁfths of the German equity crowdfunding market in terms of funding volume and number of
startups being ﬁnanced. For Companisto and United Equity, we were able to collect all investment decisions from the portal
websites for all their campaigns. The data collection for Seedmatch and Innovestment was more difﬁcult, as these portals take in-
vestment decisions off their website as soon as the funding limit is reached. Innovestment provided us with the complete investor
data for all its successful (28) and unsuccessful (17) campaigns. Finally, we hand-collected investor data for 15 of 65 Seedmatch
campaigns.
In total, we were able to collect investor data for 89 funding campaigns, which were run by 81 startups. BeECO
(Innovestment), Ludufactur (Innovestment/Companisto), Meine-Spielzeugkiste (Companisto), Payme (Seedmatch), PlugSurﬁng
(Innovestment), and swabr (Innovestment/Companisto) ran multiple campaigns, sometimes on different portals (as indicated
in parentheses). Ledora (Seedmatch) and Protonet (Seedmatch) rapidly reached the funding limit and decided to raise more cap-
ital in a second round that quickly followed the ﬁrst round. We counted these rounds as distinct campaigns, as investors could not
know ex ante that a second round would follow a few days after the ﬁrst round ended and thus did not adapt their investment
behavior accordingly. Overall, investors funding these campaigns made 26,967 investment decisions in 89 distinct campaigns and
provided 18.7 million EUR. Finally, 71,750 EUR was withdrawn after 57 investments were made.
From these data, we construct a panel dataset by aggregating the number of investments made in a particular campaign on a
single day. Thus, our unit of observation is the number of investments for a given campaign day, with a speciﬁc campaign as the
cross-sectional dimension and the day as the time dimension. For each campaign, we have as many observations as the duration
in days of the campaign, which varies from one campaign to another because many campaigns achieve their limit before the end.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the types of campaigns included in our sample. We provide summary statistics on the
panel dataset in Section 5. Overall, 81% of the 89 campaigns achieved their minimum goal. More speciﬁcally, all portals except
Innovestment were able to complete 100% of the campaigns successfully. With a high minimum investment ticket (in most
cases, 1000 EUR), which represents a self-imposed restriction on capital supply, only two-thirds of the campaigns were completed
successfully on Innovestment. This comparably lower success rate could also be due to Innovestment campaigns having deﬁned a8 Suchwithdrawal rights are now legally guaranteed inGermany under the Small Investor Protection Act (Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz) (Klöhnet al., 2015). Similar rights
apply in some other European countries.
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Table 1
Summary statistics: campaign-level data.
This table shows summary statistics of the 89 equity crowdfunding campaigns included in our sample. The dummy variable Funded (1 = Yes) indicates whether the
campaign was successful; i.e., whether the funding goal was achieved. The variable Funding Goal gives theminimum amount of money (in EUR) belowwhich the cam-
paign is unsuccessful and thus no securities are issued. Funding Limit is the maximum amount (in EUR) the entrepreneur is willing to raise and set at the start of the
campaign. The variable Total Amount Pledged gives the amount of money (in EUR) pledged during the duration of the campaign. Second Round (1 = Yes) is a dummy
variable for whether the campaign is a second round of crowd ﬁnancing; i.e., whether the entrepreneurial ﬁrm has already successfully raised equity crowdfunding
in the past either on the same portal or another. Duration gives the time length in days of the campaign. It is the actual length of time, not the maximum duration
set by the entrepreneur at the start of the campaign.Number of Backers gives the total number of crowd investors that pledgedmoney during the campaign. Legal Form
(1 = Private LLC) is a dummy variable to indicate whether the entrepreneurial ﬁrm is structured as a private LLC. Security Type (1 = proﬁt-part. loan) is a dummy
variable indicating whether the security type offered to crowd investors is a proﬁt-participating loan. Location of the Firm Berlin (1 = Yes) indicatedwhether the entre-
preneurial ﬁrm is located in Berlin.
Mean Median Min. Max. Companisto Innovestment Seedmatch United Equity
(Mean) (Mean) (Mean) (Mean)
Funded (1 = yes) 0.81 1 0 1 1.00 0.62 1.00 1.00
Funding goal (€) 51,687 50,000 15,000 150,000 30,555 60,747 66,667 20,000
Funding limit (€) 216,742 100,000 50,000 1,500,000 238,704 108,556 520,000 80,000
Total amount pledged (€) 191,135 96,000 1500 1,500,000 221,284 60,805 544,550 65,950
Second round (1 = yes) 0.09 0 0 1 0.04 0.09 0.20 0.00
Duration (days) 45 36 1 126 61 32 52 66
Number of backers 293 48 1 1982 657 20 489 42
Legal form (1 = private LLC) 0.83 1 0 1 0.81 0.78 1 1
Security type (1 = part. Darlehen) 0.38 0 0 1 0.70 0.00 1 0
Location of the Firm Berlin (1 = yes) 0.45 0 0 1 0.81 0.36 0.13 0
No. Obs. 89 89 89 89 27 45 15 2
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thresholds might have a positive effect on campaign selection, which is beyond the scope of this article.
Table 1 further indicates that the average funding goal is 51,687 EUR (median of 50,000 EUR) and the average funding limit is
216,742 EUR (median of 100,000 EUR). However, our data also vary greatly, as the largest funding limit is 1.5 million EUR. The
average campaign duration is 45 days (median of 36 days), and the average number of backers is 293 (median of 48). One cam-
paign attracted 1982 backers. Adopting proﬁt-participating loans as a standard investment contract legally allowed Seedmatch
and Companisto to raise much larger amounts per campaign (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017a, 2017b). As a result, the funding
limit on Seedmatch was ﬁve times higher as that on Innovestment, and the total amount pledged by investors was higher as well.
Moreover, because the minimum investment tickets on Seedmatch (250 EUR), United Equity (100 EUR), and, in particular,
Companisto (5 EUR) were much lower than those on Innovestment (in most cases, 1000 EUR, but sometimes even 10,000 EUR
or 25,000 EUR), more backers could join a single investment campaign. The maximum number of backers investing in a single
campaign on Innovestment was 55, while on Companisto it was 1982.
In general, startups funded on Companisto, Seedmatch, and Innovestment were young and, on average, established in 2011.
United Equity funded a construction ﬁrm that was established in 1979. Almost all ﬁrms in the sample were incorporated as a tra-
ditional LLC (the so-called GmbH), which requires a minimum legal capital of 25,000 EUR, 12,500 EUR of which must be put down
at the time of incorporation. Some ﬁrms used the little sister of the GmbH, the so-called Unternehmergesellschaft
(haftungsbeschränkt), which emerged because of regulatory competition in Europe and requires a legal capital of only 1 EUR. Al-
though the place of business is generally diverse for the campaigns under consideration, we ﬁnd that most of the Companisto
startups are based in Berlin, where the portal has its headquarter.
4.2. Key explanatory variables
To test our hypotheses, we construct several variables. Appendix Table 1 provides the deﬁnitions of these variables.
To account for the collective attention effect and allocation mechanism, we included dummy variables for the ﬁrst and last
seven days of the campaign, in line with Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017). If a collective attention effect were prevalent in equity
crowdfunding, we would expect the ﬁrst days of the campaign to attract more investments in general. Furthermore, in case the
collective attention is the only force inﬂuencing funding dynamics, the initial surge in investments should decay over time, and no
further rise should take place during the last days of the funding period. This L-shaped dynamic should particularly hold for the
portals running an FCFS mechanism. By contrast, if investors engage in late bidding under the auction mechanism, the dummy
variables for the last day of the campaign should be positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, H1 comes into play
when the ﬁrst and the last days of the campaign dummies are jointly signiﬁcant for the auction mechanism. As control variables,
we calculate the variable Active Campaigns, which gives the number of projects across all four portals that accept investments on
the same day, and the variable Competing Investments, for which we calculate the total number of investments run on a single day
across all competing campaigns on all portals included in our sample. These two variables control for a potential “Blockbuster
Effect” (Kickstarter, 2012), in which one campaign with many investors steals potential backers from other campaigns.
To test H2, we deﬁne a dummy variable called Post Funded as equaling 1 when the funding goal is achieved and 0 otherwise.
Thus, if Post Funded = 1, the entrepreneur can be certain to receive funding. Similarly, to investigate end-of-campaign effectsPlease cite this article as: Hornuf, L., Schwienbacher, A., Market mechanisms and funding dynamics in equity crowdfunding, J.
Corp. Finance (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpﬁn.2017.08.009
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the pledges for a given campaign have reached 90% and 95% of the funding limit, respectively. For example, the dummy 90%-Limit
equals 1 for a campaign with a funding limit of 200,000 EUR if backers have pledged 180,000 EUR or more. Both these dummy
variables capture end-of-campaign effects. In the empirical analysis, we consider these two variables separately rather than joint-
ly, as they are highly correlated. Using them separately allows testing for robustness of our deﬁnition.
For information disclosure (H3 and H4), we use several measures. One is the variable Update (lag 1) (Update (lag 1–7)), which
measures the number of updates posted by entrepreneurs one day before (the last seven days before) the current day of the cam-
paign. In the same vein, we construct similar count variables Comment (lag 1) and Comment (lag 1–7) for the number of com-
ments posted by previous investors. To investigate in more detail the information content of past comments, we read each
comment and categorize it into the following topics: whether the comment includes valuable information for product and/or mar-
ket development, whether the investor offers personal help, whether the investor claims to already know the product, whether
the investor claims to be an expert, and whether the investor says he or she is investing a second time (see Appendix Table 2
for a precise deﬁnition of the variable coding and examples of the respective comments). All these variables are again lagged
one day in our analysis. To ensure reliability, two researchers made this categorization independently, and a third double-checked
the categorizations when they differed between the ﬁrst two researchers. Finally, we construct the variable Comment Length
(lag 1), which gives the average length in number of letters of previously made comments, where “no comment” equals 0.
To test for peer investment effects (H5a), we construct dummy variables for lagged investments of a certain minimum size.
This allows us to test whether investors base their decisions on the observed investment behavior of other investors. The variable
Invest5k (lag 1) (Invest10k (lag 1)) gives the number of investments that have an amount of at least 5000 EUR (10,000 EUR) one
day before the current day of a given campaign. Similarly, the variable Invest5k (lag 1–7) (Invest10k (lag 1–7)) gives the number of
investments that have an amount of at least 5000 EUR (10,000 EUR) during the last seven days of a campaign. We further con-
struct similar measures for withdrawals, which we denote as Withdrawals (lag 1) and Withdrawals (lag 1–1) (H5b).
4.3. Empirical methods
To identify the drivers of investment decisions, we examine the number of investments in an equity crowdfunding campaign
on a given day. Because our dependent variable consists of count data, we begin with a Poisson regression model. As the uncon-
ditional variance of the dependent variable is larger than its mean, the Poisson model would suffer from over-dispersion, so
we reject it in favor of a negative binomial model. As we observe no equity crowdfunding activities on 29% of the investment
cycle days, we begin with a zero-inﬂated negative binomial (ZINB) model. No investment inactivity might be a function of certain
characteristics of the equity crowdfunding portal, such as the number of users registered on the portal, the number of projects
currently active on other equity crowdfunding portals, and so on. Running a Vuong (1989) test, we ﬁnd that these and other pre-
dictors cannot explain a separate process for the count values and the excess zeros. Thus, we favor the standard negative binomial
model over the ZINB model.
Our data are available for every day of the investment cycle, so we use a panel data model that takes into account the cross-
sectional and time-dependent nature of our aggregated data. Conducting a Hausman test leads us to dismiss the random-effects
model as being inconsistent. We therefore adopted a ﬁxed-effects negative binomial (FENB) estimator. The FENB model has the
advantage of removing any unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity for equity crowdfunding campaigns. For example, differ-
ences in the size of the minimum investment tickets, type of ﬁnancial security, or speciﬁc clauses in the securities contracts
will be differenced out. Because the FENB estimator, as suggested by Hausman et al. (1984), is a pseudo-panel estimator, the
model permits the identiﬁcation of time-invariant variables other than the unobserved campaign ﬁxed effects, such as the number
of patents held by the startup.
Finally, we included dummy variables to account for unobserved, time-variant heterogeneity. First, we include year dummies
to control for the surging popularity of equity crowdfunding in recent years. Second, we include dummies for the month of the
year. For example, during summertime, investors might have different opportunity costs, for example, when taking vacations
or potentially having no access to the Internet. Third, we include dummies for weekdays, as investors might not be willing to
spend their time investing on weekends in lieu of, for example, doing the shopping or spending time with their families.9
In taking our hypotheses and statistical considerations into account, we specify the following baseline equation:9 Sho
Pleas
CorpPr yi1; yi2;…; yiTð Þ ¼ FðDoICit þ Active Campaignst þ Competing Investmentst þ Post Fundedit þ Patentsi þ Directorsi
þ DoWt þMoYt þ Yeart þ CampaigniÞ;where y is the number of investments in campaign i on day t of the investment cycle, F(.) denotes a negative binomial distribu-
tion function as in Baltagi (2008), DoIC is a vector of dummies indicating the ﬁrst and last seven days of the investment cycle as
in Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017), Active Campaignst represent the number of startups across all portals that accept pledges on
day t, and Competing Investmentst are the maximum number of cumulative investments across all competing projects being
pledged on day t. In every speciﬁcation, we include a measure of innovativeness of the startup (Nbr. Patents) and a measure of
development and human capital of the startup (Nbr. Directors). These two variables are time-invariant within each campaign.ps are generally closed on Sundays, and opening hours are shorter on Saturdays in Germany.
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and Year is a vector of dummies for years from 2012 onward, excluding 2011. Finally, Campaigni captures the campaign ﬁxed
effects.
As our panel data has a time component, it is natural to question whether stationarity could be an issue. Although to the best
of our knowledge no formal tests exist for the estimation methodology used here, we checked for unit roots in a linear model
(using the command “xtunitroot” in STATA). While some unit-root tests require a strongly balanced dataset, others can be per-
formed with any structure. This is also the case for the Fisher-type test for panel data, which is the test most closely linked to
the traditional augmented Dickey–Fuller unit-root test for standard time series. We also checked other tests; all rejected the
null hypothesis that all the time series in the panel contain a unit root.5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2, Panel A, provides summary statistics for the 4027 campaign-day observations. In our sample, an entrepreneurial ﬁrm
obtains on average 6.7 investments per day, amounting to 4623 EUR. The median is smaller, with 2 investments per day and 650
EUR. This result reﬂects the skewness of the distribution of the dependent variable, which follows a negative binomial-type dis-
tribution. Moreover, 0.2 investments per day are 5000 EUR or higher, suggesting that such larger investments by a single investor
are rather rare. By contrast, withdrawals during the funding period are infrequent because most withdrawals take place after the
campaign is closed and are not part of our analysis. On average, 5.9 projects are proposed on the four portals on a given campaign
day to crowdinvestors (Active Campaigns). Panel B provides means of the different variables for each portal separately and high-
lights great variation across portals, with the most daily activities on Companisto and Seedmatch.
Regarding the distribution of campaign outcomes, we ﬁnd that almost all campaigns run on Companisto, Seedmatch, and Unit-
ed Equity reached N200% of their funding goal. However, there is also strong variation across portals (Fig. 1).Table 2
Summary statistics of panel data.
This table shows summary statistics ofmain variables for our panel data set (campaign-day observations). Panel A shows statistics for the full sample of 4027 campaign-
day observations. Panel B shows statistics for each portal separately. All the variables are deﬁned in Appendix Table 1.
Panel A: full sample
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. (overall) Std. Dev. (between) Std. Dev. (within) Min Max No. obs.
Investments 6.70 2 27.70 120.6 17.70 0 1107 4027
Amount (EUR) 4623 650 32,403 163,387 16,917 −1250 1,499,750 4027
Duration (days) 63.88 59 33.25 29.97 0 0 125 4027
Post funded (1 = yes) 0.662 1 0.473 0.437 0.254 0 1 4027
Funding goal (EUR) 46,976 50,000 22,794 24,663 0 15,000 150,000 4006
Auction (1 = yes) 0.36 0 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 4027
Updates 0.04 0 0.23 0.09 0.22 0 2 4027
Invest10k 0.06 0 0.69 2.53 0.47 0 32 4027
Invest5k 0.2 0 1.87 10.09 0.87 0 93 4027
Withdrawals 0.014 0 0.300 0.518 0.237 0 15 4027
Nbr. patents 0.156 0 0.585 0.948 0 0 7 4027
Nbr. directors 2.035 2 1.187 1.158 0 1 6 4027
Active campaigns 5.85 5 2.96 2.56 1.5 1 12 4027
Competing investments 36.04 21 59.33 119.74 53.76 0 1122 4027
Panel B: by portal for each portal separately (only means are reported)
Variable Companisto Seedmatch United Equity Innovestment
Investments 10.67 9.69 0.64 1.12
Amount (€) 3584 10,360 469 3111
Duration (days) 79.63 82.49 66.23 35.75
Post funded (D) 0.926 0.940 0.189 0.254
Goal (€) 29,882 59,744 19,318 62,346
Auction (D) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Updates 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Invest25k (D) 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.007
Invest10k (D) 0.038 0.15 0.00 0.05
Invest5k (D) 0.13 0.46 0.02 0.15
Withdrawals 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000
Nbr. patents 0.055 0.546 0.000 0.077
Nbr. directors 1.938 2.251 3.432 1.903
Active projects 5.13 7.48 4.03 5.96
Max comp. invest. 38.10 52.39 16.94 26.66
No. obs. 1659 780 132 1456
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Fig. 1. Distribution of campaign outcomes.
10 L. Hornuf, A. Schwienbacher / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2017) xxx–xxxFinally, regarding the dynamics of the funding cycle (Fig. 2), we ﬁnd that the average number of investments is L shaped, pro-
viding initial support for the collective attention effect and H1. Moreover, the pattern of average capital invested is U shaped, in-
dicating that the amount per investment was larger in the early and later phases of the investment cycle. This effect is the
strongest for Innovestment, on which the number of investments is almost ﬂat over the entire funding cycle. However, the aver-
age amount invested on Innovestment surges in the early days and especially in the end phase of the funding cycle. The strongest
support for an L-shaped funding cycle and H1 comes from Companisto and Seedmatch, which mobilize most investors per cam-
paign and follow the FCFS mechanism. The latecomer United Equity shows little activity over the entire funding cycle.Please cite this article as: Hornuf, L., Schwienbacher, A., Market mechanisms and funding dynamics in equity crowdfunding, J.
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Fig. 2. Average number of investments and average aggregate investment. The ﬁgures display funding rounds with a minimum of 10 campaign days.
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Table 3
Baseline regression on investment dynamics.
This table shows results of the baseline regressions, as speciﬁed in Section 4.3. Next to the variables reported in the table, this baseline regression also includes dummy
variables for the day of theweek, month of the year, and year dummies. All the variables reported below are deﬁned in Appendix Table 1. The dependent variable is the
number of investments in a speciﬁc campaign and day. Theﬁrst column shows results for the full sample of 4025 campaign-day observations, the second column for the
sub-sample of campaigns running under the FCFSmechanism, and the third column under the auctionmechanism. Coefﬁcients reported are incidence rate ratios. Data
take panel-data structure. Themethod of estimation is the panel-data Negative Binomial regressionwith ﬁxed effects. The last three lines reports LR-test results of joint
coefﬁcient tests. Signiﬁcance levels (for coefﬁcient being different from 1): * b 10%, ** b 5%, *** b 1%.
Explanatory variables Full sample FCFS mechanism Auction mechanism
[1] [2] [3]
1st day 14.728*** 13.374*** 10.406***
2nd day 6.532*** 7.052*** 3.204***
3rd day 3.920*** 4.503*** 1.807***
4th day 2.769*** 3.082*** 1.540*
5th day 2.317*** 2.586*** 1.329
6th day 1.855*** 2.126*** 0.911
7th day 1.702*** 1.902*** 1.340
7th last day 1.036 1.085 1.273
6th last day 1.181* 1.192* 1.415
5th last day 1.207** 1.102 1.727***
4th last day 1.269*** 1.162 1.882***
3rd last day 1.762*** 1.477*** 2.650***
2nd last day 2.413*** 1.892*** 5.124***
Last day 2.719*** 1.448*** 11.126***
Nbr. patents 1.046 0.979 1.179
Nbr. directors 1.040 0.967 0.725
Active campaigns 1.022** 1.031*** 1.007
Competing investments 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.001
Post funded 1.510*** 0.948 1.910***
Chi2 5866.22*** 7948.91*** 1071.42***
No obs. 4025 2570 1455
Chi2 (all ﬁrst days = 1) 3010.87*** 2697.38*** 403.08***
Chi2 (all last days = 1) 324.08*** 76.30*** 352.24***
Chi2 (all ﬁrst and last days = 1) 3147.07*** 2727.98*** 718.12***
12 L. Hornuf, A. Schwienbacher / Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (2017) xxx–xxxIn the rest of this section, we report the empirical results on the FENB models. First, we provide results on the baseline speciﬁ-
cation, which depicts the general pattern of investment dynamics. Second, we examine whether there is an end-of-campaign
effect, while distinguishing between the two securities allocation mechanisms used by the four portals. Third, we explore the
impact of peer investments and information originating from the entrepreneurial ﬁrm and other crowd investors.5.2. Baseline funding dynamics
In Table 3, we present the results of the baseline FENB estimations for 4025 investment days on four German equity
crowdfunding portals.10 We report incidence rate ratios, as they can conveniently be interpreted as a multiplicative effect or
semi-elasticity. This implies that all estimates b1 must be interpreted as a negative effect, while estimates N1 reveal a positive
relationship.
In line with Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017), we ﬁnd that investors are more likely to contribute in the ﬁrst and last days of a
campaign than in the middle phase of the funding cycle. Yet, as outlined in Section 5.1, most of the funding activity really takes
place in the early phase of the funding cycle, which provides strong evidence of the collective attention effect and H1. In support
of this, the incidence rate ratios on day 1 of the funding cycle are all above 14, while the incidence rate ratios on the last day of
the funding cycle do not exceed 3. The last rows in Table 3 offer a formal test of H1, where we test whether the coefﬁcients of the
ﬁrst days are also jointly different from 1. Even under the FCFS funding mechanism in Model (2), we ﬁnd a small rise in invest-
ments during the last three days of the funding period. This effect might be due to some investors closely watching the funding
dynamics and ultimately fearing that they will no longer be able to invest. Despite the brief surge in investments toward the end,
which might be due to factors unrelated to the collective attention effect, we view the investment dynamics in equity
crowdfunding as more L shaped than U shaped.
Model (3) shows similar regressions for the sub-sample of the auction mechanism. Comparison of the results of Models (2)
and (3) provides evidence that the auction mechanism leads to a stronger end-of-campaign effect. Moreover, in line with H1,
the collective attention effect and late bidding are not exclusive under an auction mechanism, as funding dynamics now clearly
resemble a U shape. We examine this difference further in the next sub-section. Table 3 also shows results of likelihood-ratio10 Our initial sample as reported in Table 2 contains 4027 observations.Wedrop twoobservations in thepanel estimations because two campaigns lasted only oneday
and no time variation exists to identify the respective campaign effects. The dropped campaigns are “HeBePro” (Innovestment) and the ﬁrst round of “Protonet”
(Seedmatch).
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rejected, providing support for an increase of investments at the end of the campaign.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd no support for the notion of a Blockbuster Effect. By contrast, we ﬁnd that more activity in general (Com-
peting Investments) triggers more investments in a particular campaign. In line with this ﬁnding, we observe that the active cam-
paigns themselves (Active Campaigns) have a small but positive effect on investments on a speciﬁc campaign day, which is also
consistent with the collective attention effect of crowdfunding—namely, if more news is spread about equity crowdfunding in
general. One possible reason for the lack of a Blockbuster Effect is that equity crowdfunding campaigns are not open-ended
and there is a limit to the campaign size. Thus, individual campaigns cannot become as large to steal potential backers from
other campaigns. This contrasts with Kickstarter, on which campaigns are typically open-ended and entrepreneurs can take as
many pledges as they want.
Finally, entrepreneurs obtain more investments after the funding goal is reached (Post Funded), indicating that investors infer a
positive signal when the threshold is surpassed. Compared with pre-funding, the number of investments is on average 51.0% larg-
er in the post-funding period. This ﬁnding is mainly driven by the auction mechanism, as we do not observe a similar trend for
the FCFS mechanism. Thus, we ﬁnd mixed evidence for H2.
In what follows, we supplement this baseline speciﬁcation with additional variables to shed further light on the funding dy-
namics and to test our hypotheses. The ﬁndings with regard to ﬁrst days, the collective attention effect, and post-funding continue
to hold. To conserve space, we do not report them again.Table 4
End-of-campaign effect.
Next to the variables reported in the table, the regressions also include dummyvariables for theﬁrst seven days of the campaign, day of theweek,month of the year, and
year dummies. All the variables reported below are deﬁned in Appendix Table 1. The dependent variable is the number of investments in a speciﬁc campaign and day.
Coefﬁcients reported are incidence rate ratios. Data take panel-data structure. The method of estimation is the panel-data Negative Binomial regression with ﬁxed ef-
fects. Signiﬁcance levels (for coefﬁcient being different from 1): * b 10%, ** b 5%, *** b 1%.
Panel A: full sample
Explanatory variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Post funded 1.689*** 1.692*** 1.691***
90% - limit 1.176*** 1.183***
95% - limit 1.158*** 1.165***
Nbr. patents 1.090** 1.061 1.085** 1.060 1.084**
Nbr. directors 0.979 1.014 0.976 1.013 0.976
Active projects 1.021** 1.022** 1.017* 1.022** 1.017*
Max comp. invest. 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002***
Chi2 5150.23 4980.44 5227.49 4967.64 5210.53
No. obs. 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025
Panel B: sub-samples by types of mechanisms
Explanatory variables FCFS mechanism (all other portals) Auction mechanism (Innovestment)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Post funded 0.946 0.952 0.944 4.283*** 3.972*** 4.040***
90% - limit 1.038 1.375**
95% - limit 0.981 1.321**
Nbr. patents 0.996 0.995 0.997 0.901 0.951 0.944
Nbr. directors 0.953 0.954 0.953 1.469 1.227 1.257
Active projects 1.034*** 1.034*** 1.035*** 0.970 0.963 0.963
Max comp. invest. 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002 1.002 1.002
Chi2 7584.20 7596.67 7579.48 438.29 439.78 439.23
No. obs. 2570 2570 2570 1455 1455 1455
Panel C: including interaction terms
Explanatory variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Post funded 0.880** 1.050 1.054
90% - limit 1.006 1.012
95% - limit 0.945 0.951
Auction 0.098*** 0.118*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.125***
Post funded ∗ auction 4.471***
90% - limit ∗ auction 3.034*** 2.947***
95% - limit ∗ auction 3.145*** 3.047***
Nbr. patents 1.010 1.017 1.019 1.021 1.023
Nbr. directors 0.974 0.960 0.956 0.956 0.953
Active projects 1.028*** 1.016* 1.016* 1.016* 1.016*
Max comp. invest. 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002***
Chi2 7394.91 7071.45 7066.74 7022.19 7016.63
No. obs. 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025
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In this section,we test the end-of-campaign effect—that is, the fundingdynamicswhena campaign gets close to the funding limit as ex
ante deﬁned by the entrepreneur. The goal is to identify whether a run-up occurs as the campaign approaches this limit. The results ap-
pear in Table 4, in whichwe extend the baseline speciﬁcation (we exclude the last-seven-day dummies to capture the end-of-campaign
effectwith our separatemeasures)with two extra variables: 90%-Limit and 95%-Limit. These two variables capture effectswhen the cam-
paign approaches the funding limit, so only a few securities are not yet allotted.We further perform the analysis on the dummy variable
Post Funded. In Panel A, we perform the analysis on the full sample. In Panel B, we run the regressions separately for campaigns using the
FCFS and auctionmechanisms. In Panel C,we again perform the analysis on the full sample but include interaction terms tomore formally
test H1. We expect these mechanisms to affect the end-of-campaign effect because an auction mechanism ensures that the campaign
lasts until the end of the announced campaign duration. By contrast, the campaign may end prematurely under the FCFS mechanism,
which could reduce the end-of-campaign effect as crowd investors may invest early on rather than wait until the end of the campaign.
Waiting under the FCFS mechanism is risky because investors may no longer be able to invest.
Our results conﬁrm this prediction. When considering the full sample (Panel A), we ﬁnd a run-up as the campaign approaches
the funding limit, such that the number of unallocated securities becomes low. However, as Panel B shows, this effect is only driv-
en by campaigns run under the auction mechanism, which provides support for H1. Under the FCFS mechanism, there is no sig-
niﬁcant end-of-campaign effect, while the auction mechanism accelerates investments by 37.5% (32.1%), as we achieve 90% (95%)
of the funding cycle. In Panel C, we offer a formal test for all three measures, PostFunded, 90%-Limit, and 95%-Limit, which we in-
teract with the dummy variable Auction, which equals 1 for campaigns run under the auction mechanism. The incident rate ratios
of the interaction effect are consistently above 1 and signiﬁcantly different from 1, while the coefﬁcients of the end-of-campaign
measure are never signiﬁcant. Taken together, these results indicate a strong end-of-campaign effect for the auction mechanism
but no effect for the FCFS mechanism and thus provides empirical support for H1.
To ensure robustness of these conclusions, we performed two additional tests not reported in the tables. First, one difﬁculty in the
identiﬁcation strategy used here is that the Auction dummy is identical to an Innovestment dummy. Thus, other unobserved factors in
portal design might drive our results. However, it is important to note that any such unobserved factors—next to the auction mech-
anism we identify—should not only be static (e.g., different contract characteristics, different website design) but also affect the dy-
namics of the funding process. Mere static factors only change the overall level of investor support and thus will be taken care of by
the ﬁxed-effect panel estimator used in our regressions. Moreover, if we were not considering an important unobserved factor, it is
unlikely that this factor would bemissing from all three portals running the FCFS mechanism, and wewould then expect very differ-
ent dynamics on Companisto, Seedmatch, and United Equity. In unreported analyses, we examined the end-of-campaign effect on
Companisto and Seedmatch separately and did not ﬁnd any effect for Companisto and, compared with the auction mechanism, a
very weak effect for Seedmatch. After further inspection, we ﬁnd that the effect on Seedmatch is largely driven by a few, very short
campaigns. Excluding the campaigns that lasted fewer than ﬁve days leads to no end-of-campaign effect even for Seedmatch.
Second, a dynamic model may be more appropriate, for example, if information cascades occur from one day to another, in line
withwhat Vismara (2017)ﬁnds for early and late investors. In this case, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable seems adequate.
However, none of the German portalswe consider in our sample tie investor proﬁles to socialmediawebsites such as LinkedIn. More-
over, to the best of our knowledge, there is no consistent dynamic panel estimator for negative binomial regressions like the Arellano–
Bond estimator for traditional panel models. Finally, for the auction mechanism, we are likely to have opposing dynamics at the start
and the end of campaign that would cancel each other out in a dynamic setting. At the start, we observe a downward movement
(coefﬁcients b 1); at the end, there is a strong increase (coefﬁcients N 1). When including a lagged dependent variable, we simply ob-
tain an average of the two opposing dynamics. Given these reasons, we do not report these estimations here, but note that the inclu-
sion of a lagged dependent variable does not affect our results on the end-of-campaign effects.5.4. Effect of information disclosure (updates and comments)
Next, we turn to examining the effect of information disclosure on funding dynamics. Different types of information are
disclosed during the funding cycle of a campaign. Block et al. (2017) argue that updates may contain new information aboutTable 5
Summary statistics on update and comment variables.
This table shows summary statistics on updates provided by the entrepreneur during the campaign and comments posted by crowd investors. All the variables reported
below are deﬁned in Appendix Table 1. Data take panel-data structure.
Variable No obs. Sum p95 Minimum Maximum
Update 4025 154 0 0 8
Comment 4025 8638 6 0 1104
Valuable info 4025 257 0 0 7
Offers help 4025 44 0 0 2
Knows product 4025 146 0 0 18
Expert claim 4025 142 0 0 4
Second time 4025 217 0 0 12
Comment length 4025 – 45.25 7 433.5
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campaign comes from investors, who can post a personal comment at the time they make an investment. Although many of
these comments are limited to a “good luck” statement, others may be valuable for the ﬁrm. As outlined in Section 4.2., we cat-
egorize comments into whether they contain information that is potentially valuable for product and/or market development
(Valuable Info), whether the investor offers personal help to the entrepreneur (Offer Help), whether the investor claims to
know the product already (Knows Product), whether the investor claims to be an expert (Expert Claim), or whether the investor
says he or she is investing a second time in the same campaign (Second Time). As these claims are only made by investors and
cannot be veriﬁed by others, such comments may just be cheap talk; whether they have an impact is an empirical question
we aim to investigate.
Table 5 provides summary statistics on the information disclosure variables. Statistics are based on panel data (campaign-day
observations). Updates are rarely posted, as evidenced by the value 0 at the 95% percentile of the variable Update. In total, only
154 updates were posted during the full sample of 89 campaigns. Conversely, comments are more frequent. In total, 8638 com-
ments were posted, often with little information content beyond personal encouragement. In 257 cases, the comments included
information that could potentially be valuable to the startup.
Table 6 shows the ﬁndings regarding the impact of updates and comments on the funding dynamics. Again, all the speciﬁca-
tions include the baseline variables. Panel A shows results with the variables Updates and Comments (both variables lagged either
1 day or 1–7 days). Panel B presents ﬁndings based on the different types of comments. Finally, Panel C introduces interaction
terms between comment type (as in Panel B) and the dummy variable Post Funded, to investigate whether there is a differential
impact when the campaign has already achieved the funding goal and therefore investments take place with certainty.
Consistent with prior research (Block et al., 2017), we ﬁnd that posting updates by the entrepreneur increases subsequent in-
vestments, particularly on the next day when an update increases the number of investments by 17.7%. Comments also have a
positive and signiﬁcant effect, but the economic impact is small. This may be because most comments are encouragement and
thus have little economic value. Panel B of Table 6 therefore shows the impact of speciﬁc types of comments on the funding dy-
namics. We ﬁnd that all types of comments have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the subsequent number of investments, with
Offers Help having the largest economic impact, followed by Expert Claim, Valuable Info, Second Time, and, ﬁnally, Knows Product.
When testing the impact of these different types of comments jointly (Regression (6)), we ﬁnd that only three remain signiﬁcant.Table 6
Impact of update and comment variables on investment dynamics.
This table shows results of the baseline regressions, as speciﬁed in Section 4.3, amended byUpdates and Comments variables. Next to the variables reported in the table,
all the regressions include dummy variables for the ﬁrst and last 7 days of campaigns, the day of the week, month of the year, and year dummies. All the variables re-
ported below are deﬁned in Appendix Table 1. In Panel C, we also include interaction terms by interacting each comment and update variablewith the dummy variable
Post Funded. In Panel C, each line corresponds a separate speciﬁcation. The dependent variable is the number of investments in a speciﬁc campaign and day. Coefﬁcients
reported are incidence rate ratios. Data take panel-data structure. The method of estimation is the panel-data Negative Binomial regression with ﬁxed effects. Signiﬁ-
cance levels (for coefﬁcient being different from 1): * b 10%, ** b 5%, *** b 1%.
Panel A: baseline regressions on updates and comments
Explanatory variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Update (lag 1) 1.177***
Update (lag 1–7) 1.072***
Comment (lag 1) 1.002***
Comment (lag 1–7) 1.000***
No. obs. 4025 4025 4025 4025
Panel B: regressions based on speciﬁc types of comments
Explanatory variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Valuable info (lag 1) 1.147*** 1.116*** 1.106***
Offers help (lag 1) 1.331*** 1.175** 1.172**
Knows product (lag 1) 1.040*** 0.976 0.979
Expert claim (lag 1) 1.218*** 1.065 1.058
Second time (lag 1) 1.084*** 1.070*** 1.070***
Comment length (lag 1) 1.002*** 1.001**
No. obs. 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025
Panel C: regressions with interaction terms
Variable considered Post funded Variable Variable ∗ post funded
Update (lag 1) 1.800*** 2.070*** 0.562***
Comment (lag 1) 1.629*** 1.029*** 0.974***
Valuable info (lag 1) 1.517*** 1.255*** 0.902***
Offers help (lag 1) 1.501*** 2.191** 0.603
Knows product (lag 1) 1.542*** 1.610*** 0.646***
Expert claim (lag 1) 1.552*** 1.840*** 0.638***
Second time (lag 1) 1.545*** 1.542*** 0.705***
Comment length (lag 1) 1.586*** 1.004*** 0.997***
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there is no longer uncertainty about whether investments take place. To investigate this issue, we add an interaction terms with
Post Funded and report the results in Panel C of Table 6. Each line in the panel is a separate speciﬁcation, which means that each
type of update or comment is tested separately (similar to Models (1)–(5) and (7) in Panel B). We ﬁnd that the impact of com-
ments is signiﬁcantly reduced in the post-funded period. Indeed, all the coefﬁcients of the interaction term are smaller than 1 and
statistically signiﬁcant, except for Offers Help.
5.5. Effect of peer investments
Finally, we examine the effect of large peer investments on the funding dynamics. As discussed previously, larger investments
convey additional information. First, wealthier individuals such as business angels who have greater capacity to evaluate this type
of investment opportunities also make larger investments. A single large investment of 5000 EUR or even 10,000 EUR may signal
the participation of more sophisticated investors and thus trigger the participation of other investors in subsequent days. Second,
larger investments may convey the idea that these investors have engaged in more thorough due diligence. Because due diligence
is costly, it is economically sensible only if someone makes a large investment. If that is the case, we expect a larger investment to
trigger more participation by others. By contrast, withdrawals may trigger a reduction in investments, as they may be a signal that
someone who invested early during the campaign received negative information and therefore decided to withdraw the money
pledged.
Table 7 reports the results on peer effects. Again, next to the extra variables on peer investments, all the regressions include
the variables of the baseline speciﬁcation shown in Table 3. In Panel A of Table 7, we show the results for the full sample. We ﬁnd
that an investment of 5000 EUR or more during the last 7 days (Invest5k (lag 1–7)) has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on in-
vestments on the following day. The economic signiﬁcance, however, is rather small, as one such investment affects the number
of investments only by 3.8%. Other speciﬁcations and deﬁnitions of variables offer little support for peer investment effects. More-
over, withdrawals do not affect investment dynamics. One possible reason is that withdrawals are extremely rare and occur most-
ly in times of heavy bidding.
One potential concern about the analysis is that the ﬁrst days of a campaign are very different from the rest. Agrawal et al.
(2015) show that friends and family, who invest for very different reasons, supported many of the investments in the ﬁrst
days of a crowdfunding campaign. Therefore, peer investment effects may not be that strong during this early funding period.
Panel B of Table 7 shows the same analysis as in Panel A, but excluding the ﬁrst seven days of every campaign. This enables
us to exclude days when peer investment effects are likely to have only marginal effects. Our results conﬁrm that peer investment
effects are stronger after the ﬁrst seven days, as evidenced in Panel B. While withdrawals continue to have no impact, larger in-
vestments (whether at 5000 EUR or 10,000 EUR) have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on investments. For example, an invest-
ment of at least 10,000 EUR increases investments on the subsequent day by 31.6%. We consider these ﬁnding strong evidence
for H5a but not H5b.Table 7
Peer investments.
This table shows results of the baseline regressions, as speciﬁed in Section 4.3. Next to the variables reported in the table, this baseline regression also includes dummy
variables for the ﬁrst and last 7 days of campaigns, the day of theweek, month of the year, and year dummies. All the variables reported below are deﬁned in Appendix
Table 1. The dependent variable is the number of investments in a speciﬁc campaign and day. Coefﬁcients reported are incidence rate ratios. Data take panel-data struc-
ture. The method of estimation is the panel-data Negative Binomial regression with ﬁxed effects. Signiﬁcance levels (for coefﬁcient being different from 1): * b 10%,
** b 5%, *** b 1%.
Panel A: full sample
Explanatory variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Post funded dummy 1.515*** 1.698*** 1.519*** 1.725*** 1.741*** 1.524***
Invest5k (lag 1) 1.038***
Invest5k (lag 1–7) 1.038***
Invest10k (lag 1) 1.095***
Invest10k (lag 1–7) 1.056***
Withdrawals (lag 1) 1.031
Withdrawals (lag 1–7) 0.992
No. obs. 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025 4025
Panel B: excluding the ﬁrst seven campaign days
Explanatory variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Post funded dummy 1.751*** 1.718*** 1.751*** 1.721*** 1.742*** 1.747***
Invest5k (lag 1) 1.066*
Invest5k (lag 1–7) 1.094***
Invest10k (lag 1) 1.316***
Invest10k (lag 1–7) 1.159***
Withdrawals (lag 1) 0.886
Withdrawals (lag 1–7) 0.952
No. obs. 3432 3432 3432 3432 3432 3432
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Several European countries as well as the United States and Canada have changed their securities regulation in recent years to
promote equity crowdfunding activities, while also ensuring that investors obtain a minimum level of investor protection
(Cumming and Johan, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017b). Most of these issuances remain outside the scope of the general
prospectus regime, so issuing securities for startups involve limited costs. We ﬁnd that a key factor inﬂuencing investments by the
crowd is how the portal allocates investment tickets. In particular, funding dynamics are affected by how securities are allotted to
investors. Consistent with our predictions, an auction mechanism induces late investments, while an FCFS mechanism induces
quick investments during the very ﬁrst days. Given the difference in dynamics, the timing of information disclosure is crucial.
Moreover, our study ﬁnds that crowd investors do react to information disclosure during the campaign, but investment deci-
sions are also rooted in the collective network interactions. Consistent with research on consumer behavior in the digital econo-
my, we also observe a sharp decay of activities after the ﬁrst couple of days, which indicates that information is so plentiful on the
Internet that attention becomes quickly limited. Furthermore, the study offers evidence that investors regard investments by larg-
er, more sophisticated investors as valuable signals. This ﬁnding is important, as many regulators have legally limited the amount
that can be invested by a single investor.
A worthy follow-up research question is whether the market mechanism affects campaign outcome and, ultimately, ﬁrm per-
formance. While the FCFS mechanism helps obtain early momentum, the auction mechanism could reduce overall funding costs
for the entrepreneur if the campaign enters a ﬁerce auction process. We leave these issues open for future research.Appendix AAppendix Table 1
List and deﬁnitions of variables (panel data).
Dependent variable
Investments: The number of investments made by crowd investors on day t in a particular campaign i.
Information disclosure variables
Comment (lag 1–7): The number of comments posted on the portal website by crowd investors during the days t-1 to t-7 of a campaign. Similarly, Comment
(lag 1) gives the number of comments posted on the portal website by crowd investors at day t-1 of a campaign.
Comment length (lag 1): The average length in number of letters of comments posted the previous day of a campaign, where “no comment” equals 0.
Expert claim (lag 1): The number of comments posted during the previous day of a campaign in which investor claims to be an expert.
Knows product (lag 1): The number of comments posted during the previous day of a campaign in which investor claims to already know the product.
Offers help (lag 1): The number of comments posted during the previous day of a campaign in which investor offers personal help.
Second time (lag 1): The number of comments posted during the previous day of a campaign in which investor says he or she is investing a second time
(either in that same round or a previous round).
Update (lag 1–7): The number of updates posted on the portal website by the entrepreneur during the days t-1 to t-7 of a campaign. Similarly, Update (lag 1)
gives the number of updates posted on the portal website by the entrepreneur at day t-1 of a campaign.
Valuable info (lag 1): The number of comments posted during the previous day of a campaign that includes valuable information for product and/ormarket development.
Peer effect variables
Invest5k (lag 1–7): The number of investments that had an amount of 5000 EUR or higher during the days t-1 to t-7 of a campaign. Similarly, Invest5k (lag 1)
gives the number of investments that had an amount of 5000 EUR or higher at day t-1 of a campaign.
Invest10k (lag1–7): The number of investments that had an amount of 10,000 EUR or higher during the days t-1 to t-7 of a campaign. Similarly, Invest10k
(lag 1) gives the number of investments that had an amount of 10,000 EUR or higher at day t-1 of a campaign.
Withdrawals (lag 1–7): The number of withdrawals during the days t-1 to t-7 of a campaign. Similarly,Withdrawals (lag 1) gives the number of
withdrawals at day t-1 of a campaign.
End-of-campaign variables
90%-Limit: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the total amount of money pledged by crowd investors represents at least 90% of the funding limit (i.e., the
maximum amount that the entrepreneur is willing to raise) and 0 otherwise.
95%-Limit: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the total amount of money pledged by crowd investors represents at least 95% of the funding limit (i.e., the
maximum amount that the entrepreneur is willing to raise) and 0 otherwise.
Collective attention variables
Day dummies: Dummy variable that equals 1 for a particular day of the campaign, starting with day 1, 2…, 7 day and ending with the 7th last day till the last
day of the campaign.
Control variables
Active campaigns: The number of campaigns across all four portals that accept investments on day t (including the current campaign).
Amount: The amount in euros invested by crowd investors on day t.
Auction: Dummy variable that equals 1 if securities are allocated to crowd investors under an auction mechanism and 0 if under a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve
mechanism. Only Innovestment offers an auction mechanism.
Competing investments: The number of investments made on day t across all other competing campaigns conducted on the portals studied (including the
current campaign).
Duration: The number of days elapsed from the start until the end of a campaign.
Funding goal: The minimum funding goal as deﬁned by the startup and portal at t = 0.
Directors: Number of directors in the startup at time of the campaign. Source: Orbis database.
Patents: Number of patents held by the startup at time of the campaign. Source: Orbis database.
Post funded: Dummy variable that equals 1 for the days a campaign has surpassed the Funding Goal and 0 otherwise.
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Appendix Table 2
Deﬁnition and examples of comment coding.
Coding of comments Examples Translation
Valuable info: The investor gives suggestions on
how to improve the product or website, on how
to access more customers, or on how to extend
the same idea to another market. Note: We were
not able to assess whether the information
provided is indeed “valuable” but coded whether
“potentially valuable ideas” are offered. For
example, stating “Please also expand to
Switzerland” is not a valuable comment, as it
might be the result of the investor living there
and being interested in having a shop nearby for
personal reasons. However, stating “Please
expand to Switzerland because no comparable
product exists on the market”might be a
potentially valuable idea.
a) “[…] Allerdings habe ich einen persönlichen
Kundenbereich sehr vermisst. […]”
b) “Schnell mit Apps auch für Smartphones
(auch Blackberry) nutzbar machen und dann
so richtig durchstarten. […]”
c) “[…] Googlesuche zu “biometrisches passbild
online erstellen” zeigt ePortrait erst auf Seite
3…ganz unguenstig…schonmal
Suchmaschinenoptimierung betrieben? […]”
d) “[…] Angenommen einer meiner Mitarbeiter
ist krank oder hatte gerade eine schwere OP,
da wäre es schon toll, ihm so eine “Werden
Sie doch schnell wieder Gesund” - Box nach
Hause oder ins Krankenhaus zu senden, wo
halt gesunde Dinge und etwas zum Naschen
bei der schnellen Regeneration nachhelfen
und mein Angestellter sieht, dass er als
Mensch auch Wert geschätzt wird und nicht
nur einfach die Ressource Arbeiter ist. […]”
a) “[…] But I really missed a personalized cos-
tumer area [on the website] […]”
b) “Quickly implement an app for smartphones
(including Blackberry) and then touch-and--
go. […]”
c) “[…] A google search for “create a biometric
picture yourself online” lists ePortrait only on
page 3… very bad…have you ever done a
search engine optimization? […]”
d) “[…] Imagine one of my employees gets sick
or experienced a severe operation. Then it
would be nice to send him a “Get well soon”
box home or to the hospital, which includes
heathy things and some goodies that help
him recover quickly and my employee real-
izes that he is valued as a human being and
not just a labor input factor. […]”
Offers help: The investor offers personal help to the
startup or founder.
a) “[…] Wenn ich unterstützen kann lasst es
mich wissen, habe viele Kontakte! […]”
b) “[…] Ich hoffe, ihr könnt auch meinen
Arbeitgeber von euch überzeugen;-)… Ich
werde ﬂeißig für euch werben! […]”
c) “Tolle Idee, falls ihr auch Teestuben etc. in
der Schweiz beliefern möchtet, bitte
melden!”
d) “[…] Stehe bei Interesse gerne mit Rat und
Tat zur Seite (Corporate Finance Spezialist
bei einer Großbank). […]”
a) “[…] If I can support you, let me know, I
have a lot of contacts! […]”
b) “[…] I hope, you can also convince my em-
ployer ;-) … I will promote you! […]”
c) “Great idea, if you want to serve tea shops in
Switzerland, please contact me”
d) “[…] If you are interested I am willing to
help with advice and action (Corporate Fi-
nance specialist at a large bank). […]”
Knows product: The investor states that he or she
has already tried the product.
a) “[…] Bin schon seit längerem Abonnent bei
Sommelier Privee und kann somit sagen, dass
sich dieses Angebot in einem eher recht
dichten Markt durch kleine aber feine Details
unterscheidet. […]”
b) “Das April-Paket war eine geniale
Kombination von Leckereien, vielen Dank!”
a) […] I am a long term subscriber of Somme-
lier Privé and can thus say that the products
differentiate themselves because of small and
crucial details in a very tight market […]”
b) “The April-box was a great combination of
goodies, many thanks!”
Expert claim: The investor claims to know the
market or have experience in that same industry.
Note: stating “I was convinced after I asked a
friend” is not a valid comment, but stating “I
work in the same industry and see the potential”
would be a valid comment.
a) “Wir nutzen Carla als Vertriebsagentur im
Shoefashion-Bereich supergerne und glauben
an weitere Erfolge des Teams rund um Ali.”
b) “[…] Hallo, ich weiß zwar nicht wie hoch die
Entwicklungskosten für die Blackberry App
sind, aber meint ihr das ist mittel- bis
langfristig sinnvoll, wenn man bedenkt, dass
der Marktanteil bei neuverkauften Geräten
bei nur ca. 6% liegt???. […]”
c) “Schaut Euch auch einmal insbesondere die
nord-europäischen Märkte an. Beispielsweise
gibt es bei vielen schwedischen Häusern statt
Kuchen am Nachmittag solche Art von
Snacks. […]”
a) “We gladly use Carla as sales agency in the
shoefashion-area and believe in the success
of the teams working with Ali”
b) “[…] Hello, I don't know how high the de-
velopment costs are for a Blackberry app, but
do you believe this is useful in the medium
and long run, if you consider that the market
share for newly sold devices is only 6%???
[…]”
c) “Have a look at the northern European mar-
kets. For example, in Sweden there are many
shops that serve this type of snacks in the
afternoon instead of cake. […]”
Second time: The investor states that he or she
pledges more money, either during the same
campaign or because he or she participated in
the previous campaign of that startup.
a) “Noch mal nachgelegt!”
b) “Ich investiere zum zweiten Mal […]”
c) “Nachgelegt!!! Meine Empfehlung:
KAUFEN!!! :-)”
d) “Nochmal ein kleiner Nachschlag auf der
Zielgeraden… :-)”
e) “Und wieder mit 5 euro dabei”
a) “Added more [money].”
b) “I invest a second time […]”
c) “Added more [money]!!! My recommenda-
tion: BUY!!! :-)”
d) “Topping up the ante on the way to the
funding goal… :-)”
e) “And I participate again with 5 EUR.”
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